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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ANTHONY JAMES ANDERSEN

:

Case No. 20020019-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
,

_*

-^

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfromconvictions for one count of robbery, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999), and one count of receiving a stolen
vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann- § 41-la-1316 (1998), in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's robbery conviction where
defendant's clothing matched the description given by the victim, defendant was
discovered less than twenty minutes after the robbery feigning sleep in a stolen vehicle
100 yards from the scene of the robbery, and defendant had with him 1) a purse
belonging to his accomplice and 2) cash in the approximate amount and denominations
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taken during the robbery?
"[Ajppellate courts should 'uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the
evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawnfromit, [the court] conclude[s] that
some evidence existsfromwhich a reasonable jury couldfindthat the elements of the crime
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah
App. 1994) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
2. Did the trial court err in not severing the charges of robbery and receiving a
stolen vehicle when defendant fled to and concealed himself in the stolen vehicle
immediately after the robbery, and the evidence of both charges was compelling?
Appellate courts will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to sever only if the
decision is a clear abuse of discretion that sacrifices a defendant's right to a fair trial. State
v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 384 (Utah App. 1997),

'

STATUTES AND RULES
The following determinative statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A.Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1999);
Utah R. Evid. 402,403, and 404(b).

<

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of robbery, a second degree
i
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) (R. 4-7). The information was
later amended to include a charge of receiving a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, in
A
2
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violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41 -1 a-1316(2) (1998) (R. 22-24). Defendant moved to sever,
claiming that trying the counts together would "taint" the jury and no probative value
supported the joinder (R. 31-34). The State responded that the crimes were "interwoven"
because the stolen vehicle likely provided transportation to the scene, served as a place of
concealment after the robbery, and could have been usedas a getaway vehicle had defendant
not been caught (R. 37). The trial court denied the motion to sever (R. 41-43).
During the jury trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the robbery charge on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to identify him as the robber (R. 200:175-77).
The court denied the motion, finding "plenty of circumstantial evidence" of defendant's
identity as the robber (R. 200:242). The jury found defendant guilty on both^ounts (R. 14546,200:243). The court sentenced defendant to two indeterminate concurrent prison terms
of one-to-fifteen-years (R. 162-64). Defendant timely appealed (R. 170).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
In the late evening of July 3, 2000, defendant forcibly robbed Christopher Wiggins
by posing as a vice officer and "arresting" Wiggins for solicitation of a prostitute (R.
199:58). After obtaining Wiggins' wallet, defendant removed the cash, struck Wiggins on
the side of the head, and fled the scene (R. 199:62-63). Less than twenty minutes later,
defendant was discovered hiding in a stolen GMC Blazer less than 100 yardsfromthe scene

1

The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^2, 25 P.3d 985.

3
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ofthe robbery (R. 199:132-33, 171).
TheRobbery
At approximately 11:00 p .m. on the night of July 3,2000, Wiggins was driving north
on State Street in Salt Lake City to visit a friend who lived in the Avenues (R. 199:53). He
was speaking with his friend on a cell phone but pulled £ver to use a pay phone when static
made it impossible to continue the conversation (R. 199:54). He parked his car in a Greek
restaurant parking lot near a pay phone (R. 199:58). The xestaurant was closed, and the
parking lot was vacant (R. 199:58). While Wiggins looked for change in his car, a woman
approached and asked if he would like a "date" (R. 199:58). Seeing that the woman was a
prostitute, Wiggins declined but continued to chat with her while he looked for change (R.
199:59).
Wiggins then heard another person approach him from behind (R. 125:59). That

i

person seized Wiggins' right arm and twisted it around behind his back (R. 199:59). The
assailant pushed Wiggins * face into the roof of his car and told him that he was under arrest
for soliciting a prostitute (R. 199:59). The assailant pretended to call for back-up and asked
Wiggins for his identification (R. 199:60-61). When Wiggins replied that his wallet was on
thefrontseat ofthe car, the assailant allowed Wiggins to reach inside and retrieve the wallet
(R. 199:61). Without turning around, Wiggins handed his wallet over his shoulder to his
assailant (R. 199:62). The attacker then struck Wiggins on his left temple, knocking Wiggins

(

to the ground. Out of fear, Wiggins remained on the ground for twenty or thirty seconds (R.
199:62-64). When he arose, both his attacker and the prostitute had gone and his wallet lay
4
4
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on the ground next to him (R. 199:62-63). The wallet was missing approximately $100 in
cash (R. 199:62-63). The $100 consisted of a "couple of twenties," a ten, a five, and "a
bunch of ones" (R. 199:63).
Although Wiggins spoke face-to-face with the prostitute, he never saw his attacker's
face (R. 64,74). However, as he reached into his car tqrretrieve his wallet, he saw that his
assailant wore blue jeans, a light colored T-shirt, and a dark bandana folded to two or three
inches and tied around the back of his head (R. 199:66). The assailant's voice was masculine
iil

(R. 199:59).
The "prostitute" is apprehended

After being robbed, Wiggins "just wanted to leave" and decided to "go home and
chalk it up as a stupid thing to do" (R. 199:94). But, as he exited the parking lot he saw the
prostitute in a Wienerschnitzel parking lot across the street (R. 199:66). She was speaking
with Officer Rick Baldwin at the driver's window of Officer Baldwin's unmarked Chevrolet
Lumina (R. 199:66,71,102). Unaware that the individual in the car was a police officer, and
thinking that the prostitute was preparing to pull the same ruse again, Wiggins stopped his
car and used his cell phone to report the robbery. Wiggens gave police a description of the
robbers (R. 199:67).2
Officer Baldwin had stopped the prostitute, Lydia, as she stood next to a Chevrolet

2

At a previous hearing Wiggins speculated that the static was due to a weak
battery (R. 199:80). At trial, he testified that when he used his cell phone to call the
police it operated correctly and without interference because it was plugged into a
cigarette lighter adapter to charge up the battery (R. 199:67).
5
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Blazer because she appeared to be loitering in an area known for crime, drugs, and
prostitution (R. 199:103). While Officer Baldwin spoke with her, he saw a man, whom he
later positively identified as defendant, in blue jeans, a white shirt, and a blue bandana
"covering the top of his head" walk by his car (R. 199:104-05).
Having no further reason to detain Lydia, OfficerBaldwin released her and turned his
attention to Wiggins, who had stopped in the street and was talking on his cell phone (R.
199:107). As Officer Baldwin pulled his vehicle:up next tp Wiggins, he heard the broadcast
regarding the robbery and the description of the suspects (199:108). Officer Baldwin
immediately realized that Wiggins was the robbery victim and that Lydia was probably the
female accomplice (R. 199:108). Baldwin immediately followed and stopped Lydia again
(R. 199:109). After a brief conversation, Officer Baldwin Mirandized and arrested Lydia
(199:109). During a search incident to arrest, Lydia produced two twenty dollar bills

from

{

her bra (R. 199:110). Lydia initially said she got the moneyfroman ATM, but then changed
her story, eventually giving four different accounts of where the money came from (R.
199:120-21). When Wiggins was later brought over to identify Lydia, he was "a hundred
percent" sure that she was the woman who had posed as a prostitute just before he was
robbed (R. 199:73,110, 124-25).
Discovery of defendant and defendant's flight
Officers Lisa Pascadlo and Benjamin Johnson responded to the robbery and arrived

^

at the scene just before midnight and within five to ten minutes of the broadcast (R. 199:128).
Officer Johnson interviewed Wiggins about the robbery (R. 200:154). Meanwhile, Officer
4
6
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Pascadlo's noticed a blue GMC Blazer backed into a slot in the Wienerschnitzel parking lot,
about 100 yards north of the scene of the robbery (R. 199:129; 200:172). Officer Pascadlo
suspected that the Blazer was stolen because it was backed in, had nofrontlicense plate, had
a missing or rolled down passenger window, and was parked in an area commonly used to
dump stolen vehicles (R. 199:129). She continued to pdtrol the area in search of suspects,
but returned to the Blazer after a few minutes (199:130).
Officer Pascadlo stopped her patrol car near the Blazer and shone her spotlight on it
(R. 199:131). As she walked toward the car with aflashlight,she saw a light blue bandana
wrapped around the steering column, a common method for concealing damage cause by a
theft of a vehicle (R. 199:131). Peering into the vehicle, she saw defendant lying prone on
the back seat, as if he were asleep (R. 199:131). Because defendant was breathing quickly
as if scared or nervous, Officer Pascadlo determined that defendant was only feigning sleep
(R. 199:132). Concluding that defendant was probably in possession of a stolen vehicle,
Officer Pascadlo ordered defendant out of the vehicle at gunpoint (R. 199:132). After a few
such commands, defendant complied and exited the Blazer with his hands raised (R.
199:133).
Officer Johnson came to assist Officer Pascadlo in detaining defendant (R. 199:134;
200:155). Before Officer Johnson could handcuff defendant, defendant fled through the
parking lot of the Greek restaurant (R. 199:134; 200:156). Both officers pursued defendant
with Officer Johnson in the lead, yelling for defendant to stop (R. 199:134; 200:157).
Wiggins noticed that the person in "the shadows" being pursued appeared to be wearing the
7
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same clothing as his assailant (R. 199:72, 76-77).
Defendant mounted a chainlink fence and paused at the top (R. 200:158). Officer
Johnson struck defendant once on each arm with an expandable nightstick causing him to fall
(R. 200:157). Defendant said, "I give up" and, as other officers arrived, he was handcuffed
and arrested (R. 200:158). During a search of defendant, officers discovered a dark blue
bandana, a Leatherman tool, a screwdriver, some electrical wire, a roll of duct tape, and a set
of keys to the stolen Blazer (R. 200:164; State's Ex. 7). The bandana was folded to two or
three inches wide (R. 200:167; State's Ex. 18). The Leatherman and GM keys were later
determined to have been left in the Blazer by its owner, Don Dalton (R. 199:23).3
After defendant's arrest, Officer Johnson noticed a bundle of cash on the opposite side
of the fence near the spot where defendant had climbed (R. 200:159). The bundle contained
{

$73, consisting of one $20 bill, one $10 bill, three $5 bills, and twenty-eight $1 bills (R.
200:161).
Evidence discovered in the Blazer
Officer Pascadlo confirmed with dispatch that the Blazer had been reported stolen
from the valet parking lot of the Sheridan City Center hotel a few days earlier (R. 199:13435). Defendant was not the registered owner and had never been authorized by the owner
to possess or operate the vehicle (R. 199:29-30). Because Officer Pascadlo was unable to

i
3

Dalton testified that the keys were an extra set he kept in the ashtray of the
Blazer (R. 199:34). One of the keys would open the door to the Blazer, and the other was
an ignition key that did not work (R. 199:34).
8
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^

contact the owner, she impounded the Blazer (R. 199:135). During an inventory search of
the vehicle, she discovered defendant's wallet in the jockey box (R. 199:135-36). The wallet
contained defendant's Utah State identification card and a pawn slip with defendant's name
on it. The jockey box also contained a black purse, in which Officer Pascadlo discovered
Lydia's picture identification (R. 199:135-36).

/

A few days later, Dalton picked up his Blazfer from the impound yard (R. 199:24).
The vehicle had suffered significant abuse including a damaged door lock and steering
column, broken grills, dented rims, and a cracked windshield (R. 199:24) Thefrontend was
out of alignment, about 500 miles had been put on the vehicle, and the license plate had been
broken off and replaced with a paper temporary license in the rear window (R. 199:24,28).
The inside of the Blazer appeared as if "a tornado had gone through it" (R. 199:25). Papers,
garbage, and cases of beer were strewn throughout the vehicle (R. 199:25). As both the door
lock and ignition switch had been damaged, the attendant showed Dalton how to open and
start the vehicle with a screwdriver (R. 199:29-29). When Dalton returned home and began
cleaning the vehicle, he discovered several items bearing defendant's name, including a birth
certificate, a telephone check, a pawn shop ticket, and a Social Security card (R. 199:25-27).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
This court should refuse to reach defendant's claim of insufficient evidence on his
robbery conviction because he has failed to marshal the evidence. Additionally, the evidence
is sufficient. Evidence, even wholly circumstantial evidence, is sufficient when this court,
9
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viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, finds that there is some evidence to support each element of the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's identity as the robber was the only issue at trial.
The jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was the robber from the fact that
defendant's clothing matched that of the robber, defendant concealed himself in a stolen
vehicle less than 100 yardsfromthe robbery andfledfrompolice when discovered therein,
a purse belonging to the accomplice to the robbery was fqund in the stolen vehicle with
defendant, and cash was discovered on both defendant and the accomplice that, when
combined, equaled the approximate amount and denominations stolen.
POINT II

>

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to sever the robbery and
receiving a stolen vehicle charges. Multiple counts are properly joined if they are part of a

'

common scheme or plan or are otherwise connected together. Defendant's possession of a
stolen vehicle was connected to the robbery because he apparently used the vehicle as a
means to travel to the crime scene and as a mobile hideout, fled to and concealed himself in
the vehicle after the robbery, and, had he not been caught, could have used the vehicle to flee
the scene.
Additionally, defendant was not prejudiced by the joinder of charges. A defendant
is not prejudiced by joinder of charges if evidence of guilt on each charge was sufficiently

\

compelling that concluding guilt as to one charge would not have tainted the jury's
consideration on the other. Defendant's physical presence in the Blazer and his numerous
10
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personal articles in the Blazer prove that he possessed the vehicle. The damage to the
Blazer's door locks and steering column prove that defendant had reason to believe that the
Blazer was stolen. Similarly, evidence identifying defendant's clothes with the robber's,
defendant's attempts to escape when approached by the police, his evident involvement with
an accomplice to commit the robbery, and the discovery of cash where he attempted to
escape and with his accomplice in amounts and in denominations stolen from the victim
strongly establishes that defendant was the robber.
ARGUMENT

^

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE LINKING DEFENDANT TO THE ROBBERY WAS
SUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY TO FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE ROBBER
Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of robbery because
the State failed to establish his identity as the robber beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Br.
at 11. Specifically, defendant claims that he "was not wearing the clothes described by the
robbery victim and nothing else identifies [him] as the robber." Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendant's
argument fails because he ignores or discounts the substantial circumstantial evidence
connecting him to the robbery and because he omits the fact that Lydia's purse was found
with him in the Blazer.
A. Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence.
To meet his burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant must
marshal all the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewed in
11
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the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient. State v. Lopez, 2001 UT
App 123,118, 24 P.3d 993; State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, f 11, 999 P.2d 1252. "In
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present,
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence."
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 13J5 (Utah App. 1991). Merely
reviewing all the evidence before the fact finder is insufficient Heineck v. Depyt of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991) (finding that defendant failed to satisfy
marshaling obligation where he "reviewed in minute detail all the evidence* and "left it to
the court to sort out what evidence actually supported the findings"). Rather, "[c]ounsel must
extricate himself or herselffromthe client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position."
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. Failure to meet the marshaling burden is grounds to
reject an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16,989
P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).
Nowhere in defendant's brief does he present a complete and comprehensive
i

recitation of alt the facts supporting his conviction. Particularly, defendant's argument omits
two crucial pieces of evidence. First, defendant fails to mention that the Salt Lake Police
found Lydia's purse and identification in the stolen Blazer (R. 199:135-36). Given Lydia's
undisputed participation in the robbery, the discovery of her purse in defendant's mobile
hideout is extremely incriminating and directly ties him to the robbery.
12
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Second, defendant fails to mention that Lydia had two twenty dollar bills in her bra
when she was arrested and that when those bills are combined with the money dropped by
defendant during his flight over the chainlink fence, the total equals $113, the approximate
amount in the approximate denominations reported stolen by Wiggins (R. 199:63, 120-21,
161). Defendant's failure to marshal these two "scraps'Vbf evidence is a ground to reject his
claim of insufficient evidence. This failure and also causes defendant's claim to fail on its
merits.
B. The extensive circumstantial evidence was sufficient for
the jury to conclude that defendant was the robber.
This court must "'uphold defendant's conviction if, upon reviewing the evidence and
all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it in a light most favorable to the verdict,
the court concludes that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that
the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Taylor, 884 P.2d
1293,1296 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 12,985 P.2d
911. "A conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence." State v. Brown, 948
P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997); see also State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f 41, 2002 WL
1587052; State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986). When a conviction is based
solely on circumstantial evidence, the court must determine "whether the inferences that can
be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience
sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown,
948 P.2d at 344. The duty of the court is not to weigh every reasonable inference and
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determine which is most likely, for '"a jury may choose which, among several reasonable
inferences, to believe.'" Id. at 345 (quoting State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah
1993). The court need determine only whether the inferences establishing guilt "logically
flowfromthe evidence." Workman, 852 P.2d at 987.
The following evidence supports defendant's rottbery conviction:4
1) Christopher Wiggins testified that on the night of July 3,2000, he was solicited by
a prostitute, Lydia Selgado (R. 199:58).
2) Immediately after refusing Lydia's offer, Wigguis was accostedfrombehind by a
man claiming to be apolice officer (R. 199:59). The man demanded Wiggins' identification,
and, after obtaining Wiggins' wallet, knocked him to the ground and fled the scene (R.
199:59-64).
3) The robber was wearing blue jeans, a light colored shirt, and a blue bandana folded

{

to two or three inches and tied around the back of his head (R. 199:66).
4) When the police apprehended him, defendant was wearing blue jeans and a light
colored shirt (R. 199:137; State's Ex. 15), and he had a blue bandana in his possession (R.
200:164; State's Ex. 7). The bandana was folded to two or three inches (R. 200:164, 167;
4

5

State's Ex. 7, 18).

5) Wiggins had approximately $ 100 in his wallet consisting of a "couple of twenties,"
—

1

I

4

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle.
5

See infra p. 18.
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a ten, a five, and "a bunch of ones" (R. 199:63).
6) Lydia was seen immediately after the robbery loitering in the parking lot of a
Wienersohnitzel across the streetfromthe robbery and not farfromthe stolen GMC Blazer
(R. 199:67-71; 200:154-55).
7) Shortly after the robbery, Officer Baldwin s&w defendant walk by him in the
Weinerschnitzel parking lot. Defendant was later discovered by police feigning sleep in the
back of a stolen GMC Blazer in the same Weinerschnitzel parking lot less than twenty
minutes after the robbery (R. 199:104-05, 131).

--^

9) Defendant attempted to flee from the police (R. 199:134; 200:156).
10) A bundle of cash was found near where defendant had attempted to escape over
a chainlink fence (R. 200:159). The bundle contained $73 consisting of one $20 bill, one $ 10
bill, three $5 bills, and twenty-eight $1 bills (R. 200:161).
11) Lydia had in her bra two twenty dollar bills; she gave four inconsistent stories of
where the money camefrom(R. 199:120-21).
12) Lydia's purse and identification card were found in the stolen Blazer (R. 199:13536).
13) The stolen Blazer contained several personal items belonging to defendant
including his Social Security Card and Birth Certificate (R. 199:25-27).
It was not unreasonable for the jury to infer the following from the foregoing
evidence:
1) Because defendant was found feigning sleep in a stolen vehicle near the robbery,
15
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and attempted to flee from police when discovered, he had a guilty conscience about both
charged offenses and was attempting to conceal himself and his identity.
2) Because Lydia was first seen next to the stolen Blazer, defendant was seen while
Officer Baldwin spoke with Lydia, and defendant's and Lydia's personal effects were found
in the Blazer, defendant and Lydia were accomplices. *
3) The wad of money found near the fence defendant mounted while fleeing police
was cash in defendant' s possession at the outset ofthe chase and defendant dropped or threw
the money in an effort to conceal it from police.
These three inferences are obvious and require little deduction. They are the simplest
explanation for the factsfromwhich they follow. To create inferences that do not implicate
defendant in the robbery, one must make illogical leaps or engage in speculation of extremely
unlikely possibilities. For example, if defendant and Lydia are not partners, then Lydia's
purse was placed in the Blazer by some means other than her own volitional act. One must
then implicate defendant in theft of her purse or assume the even more unlikely and
complicated possibility that a third person obtained her purse and placed it in the Blazer. To
conclude that the money discovered by Officer Johnson did not belong to defendant, one
must assume that it was placed or accidentally dropped there by another person. Such an

i

occurrence is extremely unlikely given the late hour, the absence of a billfold or money clip,
and the strange location (on the ground between a chainlink fence and what appears to be a

<

tub of sand (R. 200: 159; State's Ex. 16 & 17)).
When considered with defendant's proximity to the crime and the similarity between
I
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defendant's and the robber's clothing, especially the meticulously folded bandana, the
inevitable conclusion is that defendant was the robber, Lydia was his accomplice, and the
two divided the cash they stole from Wiggins. This conclusion follows logically from the
facts and, as with the preceding inferences, is the simplest explanation for the facts. The jury
thus had strong evidence from which it could reasonably'find that defendant was the robber.
Finally, it is important to note that the trial court considered the sufficiency of the
evidence in response to defendant's motion for a directed verdict. (R. 200:175-77). The trial
court concluded that there was "plenty of circumstantial evidence" (R. 200:242). This adds
further weight to the jury's verdict and the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Brown,
948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) ("'We note that the trial court considered defendant's
insufficiency of the evidence claim in denying the motion for a new trial. This action lends
further weight to the jury's verdict.'" (quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,1156 (Utah
1991)).
POINT H
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to sever the robbery and
possession charges. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. Specifically, defendant claims that the charges were
not part of a common scheme or plan and not otherwise connected and that joinder
prejudiced him by causing the jury to convict him on insufficient evidence. Aplt. Br. 22-35.
Defendant's argument fails because, as the trial court found, his possession of a stolen Blazer

17
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was connected to the robbery (Order Denying Motion to Sever, R. 41-42, attached at
Addendum B). The stolen Blazer provided anonymous transportation to the scene of the
robbery, a mobile hideout during the robbery, and would have provided an untraceable
getaway car had defendant not been caught. Additionally, defendant was not prejudiced by
joinder of the two charges because evidence of both offenses was compelling.
Whether a trial court properly denied a motion to sever is reviewed for abuse of
discretion under a two-step analysis. First, the Court must determine if the counts were
properly joined under Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(l)(a)-(6) (1999). State v. Scales, 946 P.2d
377, 384 (Utah App. 1997). Second, the Court must determine if the prejudicial effect of
i

joinder required the trial court to sever the charges under Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(4)(a).
Id. at 385. In other words, if the charges were properly joined, then the trial court has not
abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever unless defendant can prove that he was

i

prejudiced by trying the counts together.
A. The charges of robbery and receiving a stolen vehicle
were connected and thus were properly joined.
"Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same
indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are:

^

(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan." Ann. §77-8a-1(1). Offenses are
I
based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together if the conduct resulting in one
charge was "precipitated" by the conduct resulting in another. Scales, 946 P.2d at 385.
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m

When one offense is committed during an attempt to flee or cover up commission of
another offense the crimes are connected together and may be properly joined. For example,
in Scales, the defendant murdered his wife, stole several firearms and an automobile, and fled
south. Id. at 379-80. The defendant was charged in one information with one count of
murder and five counts of theft. Id. at 380. In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion
to sever, this Court found that defendant stole a Chevrolet Monte Carlo to facilitate his flight
from the murder scene and that he stole the firearms to sell and finance the flight. Id. at 385.
'•*

•

.

The Court also conjectured that the defendant stole and then sold the murder weapon
"perhaps" to dispose of it. Id. The theft and murder charges were therefore "connected
together in their commission" and properly joined. Id.
Joinder of an offense committed while attempting to conceal the primary offense was
also held proper in State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990). In Lopez, the defendant
brutally murdered a woman and then, shortly after, attempted to strangle her son to prevent
himfromtelling anyone about the murder. Id. at 41. This court held that the offenses were
properly joined because they were "closely related in time and incident to the
accomplishment of a single criminal objective, namely to kill [the victim] and avoid being
caught..." Id. at 42.
In the present case, defendant's possession of a stolen Blazer was connected to his
robbery of Wiggins. The Blazer served the same purpose in this case as the Monte Carlo did
in Scales or strangling the victim's son did in Lopez - - concealment of the defendant's
identity and defendant's connection to the crime. In its memorandum in opposition to
19
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defendant's motion to sever, the State asserted below: "[T]he stolen Blazer is related to the
robbery charge ia that it likely provided transportation to the scene of the robbery. The
Blazer also served as a place of concealment after the crime, and had defendant not been
found inside it, would have provided a getaway vehicle that could not be traced back to him"
(R. 37). The evidence at trial supported the State's assertions. The Blazer was parked
approximately 100 yardsfromthe scene of the robbery and had been backed into its spot so
as to facilitate a quick getaway (R. 199:129, 200:171). Defendant returned to the Blazer
shortly after committing the robbery and remained hidden therein, feigning sleep, while
police canvassed the area (R. 199:104, 132-33). The fact that the Blazer was stolen is
essential to its connection to the robbery charge because a stolen vehicle could not be traced
to defendant. Had he successfully evaded detection, defendant could have abandoned the
vehicle and almost completely severed any connection between himself and the robbery. In
short, possession of the stolen vehicle minimized the probability that defendant would be
detected immediately before and after the robbery and maximized the probability of his
escape after the robbery.
The crime of receiving was also closely connected to the robbery in both time and
i

location. Defendant was discovered in the Blazer approximately 100 yardsfromthe scene
of the robbery and about twenty minutes after its occurrence (R. 199:131, 144, 200:171).
Contrary to defendant's claim, the crimes of receiving and robbery did not occur "three days
apart." Aplt Br. at 21, n. 17. Defendant was charged with receiving, i.e., possession, see
supra n.4, not theft. Thus, by its terms, possession of a stolen vehicle is an ongoing crime
20
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that was still occumng when Officer Pascadlo discovered defendant in the back of the Blazer
(R. 199:132-33).
The close proximity in time of the crimes of robbery and receiving distinguishes the
present casefromthose cases cited by defendant as analogous and in support of his claim that
joinder was improper. Aplt. Br. at 29-30. Cf. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980);
State v. Gotfrey, 595 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979). In Gotfrey, two rape charges and a sodomy
charge were all separated by several months. 59$ P.2d at 1328. In McCumber, a sexual
assault charge was joined with a burglary and an attempted rape charge arising out of an
attack that occurred one month after the sexual assault. 622 P.2d 355. In both McCumber
and Gotfrey, the court determined that the charges did not form part of the same criminal
transaction because the criminal actions leading to the charges were separated by one month
and several months, respectively. See McCumber, 622 P.2d at 353; Gotfrey, 598 P.2d at
1328. McCumber and Gotfrey, therefore, are inapposite to the present case because the
defendant's possession of the vehicle was contemporaneous with the robbery and connected
to it by defendant's attempt to flee and conceal his identity in the stolen vehicle. The trial
court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in permitting the counts to be joined.
B. Defendant was not prejudiced by joinder of the offenses because evidence
of guilt for both offenses was compelling.
"If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses
or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court shall
order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or
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provide other relief as justice requires." Utah Code Ann. 77-8a-l(4)(a). 'The burden of
demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the ruling of the trial judge will rarely be
disturbed on review. The defendant must show something more than the fact that a separate
trial might offer him a better chance of acquittal." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 654 (Utah
App. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). €fne method of determining whether
a defendant was prejudiced is to consider the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each
charge. Joinder does not prejudice the defendant if the evidence supporting each charge is
so strong that introduction of evidence of a similar or connected crime does not increase the
likelihood of conviction. See Scales, 946 P.2d at 386 (holding that joinder of murder and
i

6

theft charges was not prejudicial because evidence of both crimes was overwhelming).

Defendant's conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was not made more likely
by introducing evidence of his participation in a robbery. To convict defendant of receiving

{

a stolen vehicle, the State had to show that defendant was in possession of a vehicle that he
knew or had reason to believe was stolen. Utah Code Ann. § 41 -1 a-1316(2). The following
evidence demonstrated that defendant physically possessed the vehicle: 1) defendant's
physical presence in the vehicle (R. 199:133); 2) defendant had a set of keys to the vehicle
4
(R. 199:34); 3) defendant had a screwdriver that could be used to start the vehicle (R.
6

Usually, the threshold inquiry to determine whether a defendant is prejudiced is
"whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial."
State v. Lee, S31 P.2d 114, 118(UtahApp. 1992). However, following this Court's
analysis in Scales, analysis of evidence of the other crime under Utah Rule of Evidence
404(b) need not be undertaken if the evidence of both charges is compelling. 946 P.2d
385-86.

<

I
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200:164); and 4) defendant's birth certificate, identification card, Social Security Card, and
other items belonging to defendant were in the Blazer (R. 199:25, 135-36). Clearly,
defendant was not only in possession of the Blazer, but was probably using it as a temporary
domicile.
Defendant had reason to believe the vehicle was stolen from its condition. The
driver's side door lock had been "jimmied" and peeled out of the door (R. 199:24). The
steering column had been damaged and the ignition switch altered to start with a screwdriver
(R. 199:24,28). The Blazer had nofrontlicense plate, arid the rear license plate had clearly
been broken off (R. 199:28, 129). Also, defendant did not know the registered owner and
did not have permission from that owner to use or retain the Blazer (R. 199:29-30).
Defendant did not put on a defense and extracted no testimony during crossexamination to impeach the evidence proving that he possessed the vehicle and that he had
reason to believe it was stolen. Faced with overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence that
defendant possessed the Blazer and had reason to believe it was stolen, the jury was not
tainted by joining the robbery charge to the receiving charge.
Notwithstanding defendant's assertions to the contrary, see Aplt Br. at 13-20,
evidence to support the robbery charge was also compelling. As noted above, the only
genuinely disputed issue concerning that charge was identity. The following evidence and
reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence demonstrated that defendant was the
robber: 1) defendant was identified by a police officer in the immediate vicinity of the
robbery only moments after the offense and was later discovered feigning sleep in the back
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seat of the Blazer in the immediate vicinity of the offense less than twenty minutes after the
robbery (R. 199:104-05,131); 2) when he was apprehended, defendant's light-colored shirt,
jeans, and dark blue headband folded to two to three inches in width matched the victim's
description of the roober's clothes (R. 199:66, 137; 200:164); 3) Lydia, who evidently
assisted in the robbery by posing as a prostitute, revealed her connection with defendant by
stashing some of her personal effects in the stolen Blazer and by loitering around the vehicle
immediately after the robbery (R. 199:58-59, .67-71, 135-36; 200:154-55); 4) defendant
attempted to flee from the police (R. 199:134; 200:156); and 5) a bundle of cash, found on
the other side of a fence defendant tried to scale in hisflightto escape arrest, and the money
found in Lydia's bra, closely matched the amount and the denominations of cash stolen from
the victim (R. 199:63; 200:120-21, 159-61). Because this evidence strongly indicates that
defendant, acting with Lydia as an accomplice, robbed the victim, defendant's claim that he
was prejudiced by joinder fails.
Defendant's claim that joinder affected his decision to proceed to trial on the receiving
charge is frivolous. Aplt. Br. at 35. Defendant cites no support in the record nor does he
explain how or why joinder would cause him to refuse a plea bargain. Defendant does not
even claim that joinder actually caused him to refuse a plea bargain, only that it "affected
[his] decision to proceed to trial on the possession charge." Aplt. Br. at 35.
As the charges were properly joined before trial, and defendant was not prejudiced by
their joinder, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the charges.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f3

day of September, 2002.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
AssistanfrAttorney General
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MOTOK Vfc.HU.UiC3

41 -la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty.
It is a second degree felony for a person:
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken
if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his
duty.
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE.

76-6-30L Robbery.
( D A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes op attempts to take
personal property in the possession o f another ffom his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means offeree or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants.
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may. be charged in the
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the
offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in
their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant
is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor
and felony offenses.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
conduct or in the same criminal episode.
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more
than one. could have been joined in a single indictment or information.
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a
single indictment or information.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief
as justice requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived
if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a
motionDigitized
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ITAH RILES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state'
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

/

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its^obative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of tindue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the
accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefUlness of the alleged
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused,
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 2001.)
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney
JOY E. ONTON, Bar No. 7945
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

\il\

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

'

ANTHONY JAMES ANDERSEN,
Defendant.

.

' PROPOSED ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER

. ]
;>

Case No. 001911529
DA No. 00013524
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

]

The defendant's Motion to Sever came before the Court for oral argument on March 12,
2001, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs presiding. The defendant was represented by his counsel,
Robin K. Ljungberg, and the State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Joy Onton.
The Court, having reviewed the briefs filed by the parties and the case law cited therein,
having heard the argument of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Sever is DENIED for the following
reasons:
1.

The Court finds that the two counts contained in the State's Amended

Information, Robbery and Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, are based on the
same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission. The two crimes were
committed in close physical and temporal proximity to each other. In addition, evidence from
the robbery was discovered in the stolen vehicle. Two blue bandanas, one of which was
allegedly used in the commission of the robbery, and documentation belonging to both co-
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defendants were found inside the stolen Blazer. Defendant Anderson was also found hiding
inside the stolen vehicle shortly after the robbery was committed.
2.

Defendant will not be prejudiced by a joinder of the offenses because evidence

regarding both counts would be mutually admissible to prove identity of the perpetrators if
separate trials were held.
3.

The interests of judicial ecomony will best be served by having a single trial since

the same witnesses will be called to testify regarding, both counts.
DATED this ?l

day of March, 2001.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER was delivered to Robin Ljungberg, Attorney
for Defendant Anthony James Andersen, at the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East
500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 on the i3 1k \iay of March, 2001.
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